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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
JUVENILE COURTS-Juveniles in Delinquency Proceedings 
Are Not Constitutionally Entitled to the Right of 
Trial by Ju.ry-McKeiver v. Pennsylvania* 
At a hearing in the juvenile court of Philadelphia in October 
1968, Joseph McKeiver was declared a "delinquent child" and 
placed on probation by a juvenile court judge who determined that 
McKeiver had violated a Pennsylvania law.1 The juvenile court 
petition charged McKeiver, then sixteen years old, with robbery, 
larceny, and receiving stolen goods as the result of an incident in 
which McKeiver and twenty or thirty other youths took twenty-five 
cents from three teenagers. Despite the fact that the evidence against 
McKeiver consisted primarily of the weak and inconsistent testi-
mony of two of the victims,2 the juvenile court judge, following 
normal practice in juvenile cases, denied McKeiver's request for a 
trial by jury.3 McKeiver's subsequent application for a rehearing, 
alleging error in the judge's refusal to grant a jury trial, was like-
wise denied.4 
In a separate proceeding before the same juvenile court, Edward 
Terry, age fifteen, was adjudged delinquent and committed to a 
Pennsylvania juvenile institution by order of the trial judge.5 Terry 
was found to have struck a park guard while the guard was at-
tempting to stop a fight that Terry was observing. His request for a 
jury trial was also denied by the juvenile court judge. In per curiam 
decisions, without written opinion, the superior court affirmed the 
denial of the jury trial requests in both cases. 6 
Appeals from these two decisions, which were consolidated before 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,7 presented the question whether 
a jury trial is required under the Federal Constitution in juvenile 
• 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
1. PA. STAT. tit. 11, § 243 (1965) provides in part: 
(4) The words "delinquent child" include: 
(a} A child who has violated any law of the Commonwealth or ordinance of any 
city, borough or township .••. 
2. The two victims who testified differed substantially in their testimony concern-
ing the material facts. One claimed the robbery was a group effort, the other that 
McKeiver acted alone. Both stated that McKeiver rode a bicycle during the entire 
time, although one identified him by his distinctive walk. The victims also claimed 
the robber did not wear glasses, which McKeiver had worn since childhood. In re Terry, 
438 Pa. 339, 341 n.l, 265 A.2d 350, 351 n.l (1970), afjd. sub nom. McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
3. 438 Pa. at 341 n.l, 265 A.2d at 351 n.l. 
4. 438 Pa. at 342 n.l, 265 A.2d at 351 n.l. 
5. 438 Pa. at 342 n.2, 265 A.2d at 351 n.2. 
6. In re McKeiver, 215 Pa. Super. 760, 255 A.2d 921 (1969); In re Terry, 215 Pa. 
Super. 762, 255 A.2d 922 (1969). 
7. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970). 
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delinquency proceedings. 8 Over a strong dissent9 that court affirmed 
the action of the juvenile court judge. Speaking for the majority, 
Justice Roberts reasoned that basic differences exist between the 
juvenile and criminal systems, which make the jury less essential 
and, perhaps, even detrimental to the juvenile system. Consequently, 
the majority concluded that the Constitution does not compel ex-
tension of the right to jury trial to juveniles. 
In re Burrus10 also raised the question of the constitutional right 
to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. Barbara Burrus and forty-
three other black juveniles, all under the age of sixteen, were tried 
in a consolidated hearing before a North Carolina state district 
court judge sitting as a juvenile court. State highway patrolmen filed 
the juvenile court petition and were the only witnesses in a closed 
hearing before the juvenile judge.11 Counsel for the juveniles re-
quested a public trial and a jury trial. Both requests were denied. 
The judge then ruled that the children had violated state law by 
impeding traffic during a series of protests against a school consoli-
dation plan. On the basis of this violation the judge declared the 
juveniles "delinquent" under state law12 and ordered them com-
mitted for an indefinite period. He then suspended the commitments 
on the provision that the juveniles observe the conditions of a one-
year probation.13 The decision of the juvenile judge was affirmed by 
the state court of appeals.14 On appeal, the state supreme court modi-
fied the juvenile court's disposition by deleting the commitment 
provision on the ground that the juvenile court was authorized by 
statute to use but one provision for disposition.16 Having thus 
modified the disposition of the hearing judge, the court affirmed the 
denial of the request for jury trial.16 
8. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury •••• " U.S. CoNsr, amend. VI. The right to a jury 
trial is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
9. 438 Pa. at 351, 265 A.2d at 356 (Cohen, J., dissenting). Justice Cohen asserted 
that the right to jury trial, as applied to the states in criminal proceedings by Duncan, 
was equally applicable to state juvenile court proceedings. He criticized the arguments 
of the majority as failing to present a basis for distinguishing between the criminal and 
juvenile systems for purposes of jury trial. 
10. 167 S.E.2d 454 (N.C. App.), afjd. as modified, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 
(1969), afjd. sub nom. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
11. 403 U.S. at 537. 
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(2) (1969) provides: 
"Delinquent child" includes any child who has committed any criminal offense 
under State law or under an ordinance of local government •••• 
13. 167 S.E.2d at 457. 
14. 167 S.E.2d at 461. 
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-29 (1944) provides that a juvenile court judge choose one 
of five possible provisions for disposition of a child. The judge in Burrus therefore 
exceeded his authority by making the disposition in the alternative between commit-
ment and probation. 275 N.C. 535-36, 169 S.E.2d at 891. 
16. 275 N.C. at 536, 169 S.E.2d at 891. 
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The United States Supreme Court combined the two cases for 
consideration of the single issue "whether the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment assures the right to trial by jury in the 
adjudicative phase of a state juvenile delinquency proceeding."17 
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Blackmun affirmed the 
state court decisions, holding that the concept of due process of law as 
applied to juvenile court proceedings does not include the right to 
trial by jury.18 The majority refused to extend to juveniles the jury 
trial right granted to defendants in state criminal proceedings in 
Duncan v. Louisiana.19 The Court found sufficient differences be-
tween the juvenile and criminal systems to preclude application of 
Duncan. The majority also concluded that denial of the right to 
jury trial in juvenile proceedings does not violate the fundamental 
fairness standard of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment20 and further reasoned that jury trials in the juvenile court 
setting would inhibit future reform of the juvenile system by the 
states. 
Although the Court concluded that jury trials are not constitu-
tionally required in juvenile proceedings, the conflicting reasons 
presented by the five separate opinions21 are indicative of the Court's 
confusion over which standard is applicable in determining juve-
niles' due process rights. Justice White's separate concurring opinion 
focused on the rehabilitative rather than the punitive purpose of 
the juvenile system. Concluding that the purpose of juvenile com-
mitment is rehabilitation of the offender, he reasoned that such 
commitment is not a measure of society's view of the blameworthi-
ness of the act and that the stigma of criminality is therefore avoided. 
Justice Brennan noted a value historically safeguarded by the 
jury, freedom from government oppression, and concluded that 
public trial may adequately serve the same purpose. Thus, he distin-
17. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 530 (1971). 
18. 403 U.S. at 545. 
19. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Duncan was convicted under Louisiana law for simple 
battery, a misdemeanor. He was sentenced to sb,ty days' imprisonment and fined $150. 
He appealed his conviction on the basis that the sixth amendment, made applicable 
to the States through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, required 
that the right to jury trial be granted in all serious criminal cases. The Court recog• 
nized as controlling the two-year maximum penalty Duncan could have received 
rather than the sbcty days he did receive, and reversed his conviction as a deprivation 
of the due process right to jury trial. 
20. Having concluded that delinquency proceedings were not criminal proceedings 
for purposes of the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee, the Court was still com• 
pelled to determine whether the concept of due process itself required the availability 
of jury trial. 
21. Concurring in Justice Blackmun's majority opinion were the Chief Justice and 
Justices White and Stewart. Justice White also filed a separate concurring opinion. 
403 U.S. at 551. Concurring in the judgment only was Justice Harlan. 403 U.S. at 
557. Justice Brennan concurred in McKeiver but dissented in Burrus. 403 U.S. at 553. 
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Black and Marshall. 403 U.S. 
at 557. 
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guished 1vlcKeiver from Burrus.22 In the latter he voted for reversal 
on due process grounds because the juvenile had been denied the 
right to a jury trial and the right to a public hearing.23 He concurred 
in McKeiver, indicating that the right to a public trial under Penn-
sylvania law compensates for the lack of a right to jury trial.24 
It is ironic that the needed fifth vote in Burrus was cast by 
Justice Harlan, who based his opinion on the contention that 
Duncan, which applied the right to a jury trial in serious criminal 
cases to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, was wrongly decided. Therefore, Justice Harlan rea-
soned, the state is not required by the due process clause to extend 
the right to jury trial in any proceeding. Justice Douglas, joined by 
Justices Black and Marshall in dissent, asserted that the punitive 
nature of juvenile incarceration clearly makes Duncan, and thus the 
right to jury trial, applicable to juvenile court proceedings. The 
obvious divergence of views among the Justices is in large part 
due to a conflict within the Court whether to extend recent Court 
decisions that have subjected juvenile court procedures to close con-
stitutional scrutiny or, alternatively, to withhold for the present 
further expansion of the rights of juveniles in juvenile courts. 
That the Court has experienced difficulty in applying its tradi-
tional scrutiny to the juvenile process is not surprising. It is in part a 
function of the theory and the historical development of the juvenile 
justice system in the United States. In 1899,2G state and local authori-
ties began enacting juvenile court acts, which dispensed with tradi-
tional criminal procedure under the aegis of the doctrine of parens 
patriae.26 Under this doctrine, it is thought that a system having as its 
22. 403 U.S. at 555-56. 
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-24 (1966), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT, § 7A-285 (1969), 
provided in part: , 
In the hearing of any case coming within the provisions of this article the general 
public may be excluded and only such persons admitted thereto as have a direct 
interest in the case. 
Justice Brennan found that the above North Carolina statute either permitted or re-
quired exclusion of the general public from the juvenile hearing. Moreover, the juve-
niles in Burrus repeatedly requested a public hearing, which was denied by the 
juvenile court judge. 403 U.S. at 556 &: n.4. 
24. The applicable statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 245 (1965), provides only that 
juvenile proceedings be "separate" from regular court business. Inasmuch as the 
press were generally admitted to juvenile court headngs and as no persons for whom 
appellants sought admission were excluded from the hearing, Justice Brennan con• 
eluded that Pennsylvania juvenile court judges interpreted this statute to allow juve-
niles a public trial. 403 U.S. at 555-56 &: n.2. 
25. The first juvenile court in the United States is generally considered to have 
been established in Cook County, Illinois, on July 1, 1899. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 
23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 107 (1909). (This article contains an excellent report of the his• 
tory and views of the early juvenile court reformers.) 
26. Parens patriae, translated from Latin as "father of his country," is the doctrine 
traditionally employed by the sovereign in English chancery courts to justify com• 
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objective the benefit rather than the punishment of the individual 
need not meet the due process requirements of our traditional system 
of criminal justice. It is only in the past five years that the Supreme 
Court has expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of the 
juvenile system and a consequent willingness to subject that system 
to constitutional scrutiny. 
The initial shock to the juvenile system was delivered in 1966 
by Justice Fortas in Kent v. United States,21 when the Court for the 
first time questioned the procedural aspects of the juvenile court sys-
tem.28 In Kent, the Court reversed and remanded sixteen-year-old 
Morris Kent's criminal conviction and sentence29 on the ground 
that he was denied due process rights when the District of Columbia 
juvenile court improperly waived jurisdiction and transferred him 
to the criminal court.30 More shocking than the Court's holding were 
Justice Fortas' comments, questioning whether the parens patriae 
theory underlying the juvenile court system was, in reality, so poorly 
applied that the Court must intervene with broad procedural re-
forms to protect the rights of juveniles: 
•.• [S]tudies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to 
whether actual performance [ of the juvenile courts] measures well 
enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity 
of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable 
to adults. There is much evidence that some juvenile courts, includ-
mitment of minors or the insane without formal procedural safeguards accorded 
criminals. The sovereign is viewed under this doctrine as a benevolent master whose 
custody will ultimately be of benefit to the individual. See generally Macie, supra note 
25, at 109; Paulsen, Kent v. United States, The Constitutional Context of Juvenile 
Cases, 1966 Sup, Cr. REV. 167, 173-74. 
27. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
28. The McKeiver Court mentioned two cases preceding Kent that dealt with the 
rights of juveniles, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), and Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 
U.S. 49 (1962). However, neither dealt with a juvenile's rights in a juvenile court. 
29. Kent was found guilty on six counts of housebreaking and robbery, but he 
was deemed "not guilty by reason of insanity" of rape charges. The court sentenced 
him to serve five to fifteen years on each of his criminal convictions (or a total of 
thirty to ninety years); however, under District of Columbia law he was mandatorily 
committed to a mental institution because of the insanity acqnittal. 383 U.S. at 550 
&: n.9. 
30. The Supreme Court interpreted the District of Columbia juvenile statute, 
D.C. CODE § 11-914 (1961), as amended, D.C. CODE § 11-1553 (1967), to require that 
juveniles be given a hearing at which they are entitled to counsel and a statement of 
reasons before a juvenile court may waive jurisdiction in favor of a criminal court 
because of the demands of due process. Additionally, counsel for an accused juvenile 
is entitled to access to the social report. Subsequent review of the waiver should in-
volve actual review rather than presumption of the validity of a juvenile court's 
decision. 383 U.S. at 557, 561. The Court also enumerated other rights to which a 
juvenile is entitled under District of Columbia law, including protection from pub-
licity, confinement with adults only in rare circumstances, confinement only until 
majority, no loss of civil rights resulting from a delinquency determination, and a 
preference for parental custody over institutionalization. 383 ,U.S. at 556-57 & n.26. 
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ing that of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel, facilities, 
and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State 
in a parens patriae capacity, at least with children charged with law 
violation. There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for 
concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he 
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous 
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.31 
Although only dictum, this attack by Justice Fortas on the juvenile 
system presaged subsequent Court intervention into the theory and 
procedure of juvenile justice. 
The landmark decision extending certain due process rights to 
juveniles came a year later in In re Gault.32 Gerald Gault was com-
mitted to a juvenile institution for the remainder of his minority 
after a juvenile court judge determined he was "habitually involved 
in immoral matters," as evidenced by his admission of having made 
obscene phone calls.33 The Supreme Court granted Gault's petition 
for a ,vrit of habeas corpus on the grounds that basic due process 
rights of notice, counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, and 
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses were denied Gault 
at the adjudicatory stage of his juvenile hearing. Justice Fortas, 
writing for the majority, re-emphasized the Court's general dis-
satisfaction with juvenile courts, but limited the holding to these 
four specific due process rights.34 
Thereafter followed three juvenile delinquency cases in which 
the question of the right of juveniles to a jury trial was specifically 
raised. Each time the Court avoided the issue by disposing of the 
cases largely on procedural grounds. The Court declined to con-
front the issues of the applicable standard of proof and the need for 
jury trial in juvenile proceedings when it vacated and remanded In 
re Whittington,35 per curiam, "for consideration in light of In re 
Gault."36 DeBacker v. Brainard37 presented the Court with a second 
opportunity to resolve the issue of jury trial for juveniles, which the 
Court rejected by dismissing the appeal per curiam as "improvi-
dently granted."38 The Court relied upon the rule promulgated in 
Destefano v. Woods,39 that Duncan be given only prospective applica-
31. 383 U.S. at 555-56 (footnotes omitted). 
32. 387 U.S. I (1967). 
33. 387 U.S. at 8 n.5. See Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-20l-6(d) (1956), as amended, 
AJUz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201-9 (Supp. 1971). 
34. 387 U.S. at 57-58. Although recognizing that Gault was urging the Court to 
consider other issues on due process grounds, the Court specifically withheld opinion 
on these other issues. 
35. 391 U.S. 341 (1968). 
36. 391 U.S. at 344. 
37. 396 U.S. 28 (1969). 
38. 396 U.S. at 33. 
89. 392 U.S. 631 (1968). 
November 1971] Recent Developments 177 
tion, to foreclose DeBacker's appeal· since his juvenile court hearing 
was held before Duncan was decided. 
In the third case, In re· Winship,40 the Court did extend due 
process in the area of juvenile proceedings by holding that juvenile 
courts must apply the same standard of proof for guilt as that applied 
in criminal proceedings. Samuel Winship, age twelve, was found 
upon "a preponderance of the evidence"41 to have stolen 112 dollars 
from a pocketbook in a woman's locker and was consequently com-
mitted for a period of from eighteen months to six years. The Court 
held that Winship's due process rights were denied by failure of 
the hearing judge to use the criminal standard of "beyond a reason-
able doubt" in the adjudicatory. phase of a juvenile delinquency 
hearing for an act which, if committed by an adult, would have been 
a criminal offense.42 Although making inroads into the fact-finding 
process, the Court did not question the denial of the right to a jury 
trial to the juvenile. 
The Supreme Court's decisions from Kent through Winship dis-
played a new-found willingness to measure the procedural aspects 
of juvenile courts against the due process model of the criminal 
courts. The Kent and Gault opinions, however, are a paradox of 
broad dicta and narrow holdings, extending to the juvenile every 
right the Court decided to consider, yet failing to review the entire 
system.43 Despite the fact that Winship applied the criminal standard 
of proof to juvenile proceedings, Chief Justice Burger's dissent44 was 
40. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
41. 397 U.S. at 360. 
42. 397 U.S. at 359. The Court specifically refused to answer the question whether 
the criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is required in other types of 
juvenile court actions. 397 U.S. at 359 & n.1. Two significant areas thus unaffected 
by Winship are the category of persons "in need of supervision" (PINS) used by New 
York to retain custody over unmanageable juveniles (see N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr § 712(b) 
(McKinney 1963)), and delinquency status jurisdiction based upon a finding that the 
juvenile is "habitually involved in immoral matters," as was Gerald Gault. The cate-
gory of PINS allows expansion of juvenile court jurisdiction to cover a child who is 
only unruly; it also serves as the basis for a distinction requiring separation of PINS 
from delinquents who have committed serious offenses. Moreover, it attempts to 
minimize the stigma that might otherwise be placed upon the unmanageable child 
had he been found delinquent. . . . 
Delinquency status !leterminat_ions present constitutional problems beyond the 
mere standard of proof. Many states can obtain jurisdiction on the basis of a status 
determination, and two recent studies have shown that a high percentage of juveniles 
(between 25% and 63%) are in fact handled under such provisions. See N. MORRIS & 
G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CruME CONTROL 160 (1970). The Su-
preme Court currently has on its docket Maillard v. Gonzalez (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971), 
appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. April 9, 1971) (No. 70-120), which challenges as 
unco!]stitutionally _vague a California statute providing for such a status determina-
tion. See generally Comment, Statutory Vagueness in Juvenile Law: The Supreme Court 
and Mattiello v. Connecticut, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 143 (1969). 
· 43. See notes 34-42 supra and accompanying text. 
44. In his dissent in Winship, the Chief Justice, joined by Justice Stewart, said: 
What the juvenile court system needs is not more but less of the trappings of 
178 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70 
perhaps a premonition of yet another shift in the Court-a shift 
away from further review of the juvenile process that had seemed 
imminent after Gault. It is against this background that the Court 
finally considered the jury trial question in McKeiver. 
A comparison of the reasoning of Justice Blackmun's majority 
opinion with the four other opinions in McKeiver reveals the stan-
dard by which the Court now measures the due process rights of 
juveniles in juvenile court proceedings. The majority's first and 
perhaps most crucial contention was that there are not sufficient 
similarities between the juvenile and criminal systems to equate 
them.45 It is indeed a crucial argument for the majority because if 
the juvenile system cannot be distinguished from the criminal sys-
tem, Duncan would require that the right to a jury trial be made 
available in juvenile proceedings. To support the proposition that 
the two systems are significantly different and therefore deserve 
separate treatment, the majority noted the Court's careful avoidance 
in the past of the criminal label for juvenile proceedings; it likewise 
relied heavily upon distinctions drawn by Justice Robert's opinion 
in In re Terry.46 Neither tack is particularly persuasive. 
It is quite correct that the Court has never termed delinquency 
proceedings as criminal, but the Court has nonetheless extended 
significant due process safeguards to juveniles in Kent, Gault, and 
Winship. This approach suggests that the Court's real purpose in 
forgoing the use of the criminal label was not to deny juveniles 
some of the rights extended to criminals, but rather to avoid 
bringing the added disabilities of being adjudged a criminal upon 
a child already stigmatized by being declared delinquent.47 Clearly 
it is not necessary to label juveniles "criminal" in order to extend due 
process rights to juvenile proceedings. 
Justice Roberts' three attempts to distinguish the two systems 
are similarly unconvincing and appear refuted by recent studies of 
the juvenile system. He first maintained that the juvenile court judge 
takes a different view of his role than does the criminal court judge. 
Justice Roberts cited Commonwealth v. ]ohnson48 as a paradigmatic 
legal procedure and judicial formalism; the juvenile court system requires breath-
ing room and flexibility in order to survive, if it can survive the repeated as-
saults from this Court. 
397 U.S. at 376. 
45. 403 U.S. at 541. 
46. See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text. 
47. Indeed, the Court suggested just such reasoning in Gault. 387 U.S. at 22-24. 
48. 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967) (denial of fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination to juvenile in juvenile court held deprivation of due pro• 
ccss). 
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statement of the role for the juvenile court judge. Johnson indeed 
provides an instructive guide to juvenile court judges, but it is merely 
a guide. It describes how a judge ideally should administer juvenile 
cases rather than how in fact they are presently administered.49 In a 
recent study of juvenile court judges in the United States, the second 
most pressing problem listed by the judges from small jurisdictions 
was inadequate knowledge of the proper procedure for handling 
juvenile cases.5° Furthermore, the same study indicates that present 
juvenile court judges lack the basic training, time, and resources to 
attain the goals outlined by Justice Roberts.51 
The second assertion in Roberts' opinion is that the systems are 
distinguishable on the basis of the far superior diagnostic and re-
habilitative care afforded the juvenile. Justice Fortas had earlier 
contested this premise in Kent when he maintained that the juve-
nile system lacked the basic ingredients necessary to attain the theo-
retical goal of rehabilitation. 52 Although no definitive studies 
expressly compare the relative merits of the juvenile and criminal 
systems in rehabilitation and diagnosis, 53 The President's Task Force 
Report on Juvenile Delinquency54 indicates a profound dissatis-
faction with the rehabilitative care accorded juveniles. 55 A thorough 
study of juvenile institutions shows them to be overcrowded56 and 
49. 211 Pa. Super. at 76-77, 234 A.2d at 17. 
50. McCune 8: Skolcr, Juvenile Court Judges in the United States: A National Pro-
file, pt. I, 11 CRIME 8: DELINQUENCY 121, 130, Table 2 (1965). 
51. Id. at 125-28. See notes 100-01 infra and accompanying text. 
52. See text accompanying note 31 supra. 
53. Two recent empirical studies, however, have attempted to gauge the effective-
ness of the juvenile system by comparing the later incidence of delinquency of juveniles 
who were apprehended with those who were not. The report of these studies con-
cluded that apprehension itself encourages rather than deters further delinquency. 
Gold 8: Williams, National Study of the Aftermath of Apprehension, 3 U. MrcH. J. L. 
REF. 3 (1969). 
54. TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUE~CY, REPoRT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND 
YoUTH CRIME (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. This report is the result of the 
most comprehensive study of the problems and procedures of the juvenile system ever 
attempted in the United States. When the Task Force cites the underlying studies 
from which it drew its conclusions, those studies will be noted. However, when it 
draws conclusions of fact (as opposed to recommendations) without detailing the basic 
studies, those conclusions alone will be reported. 
55. Institutionalization too often means storage-isolation from the outside world 
-in an overcrowded, understaffed, high-security institution with little education, 
little vocational training, little counseling or job placement or other guidance upon 
release •••• 
• • • There are problems that go much deeper [than infusion of resources]. The 
failure of the juvenile court to fulfill its rehaoilitative and preventive promise 
stems in important measure from a grossly overoptimistic view of what is known 
about the phenomenon of juvenile criminality and of 'what even a fully equipped 
juvenile court could do about it. · 
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 8. 
56. National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Correction in the United States, 
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critically understaffed, lacking the minimum of professional help 
in all areas: psychologists,57 psychiatrists,68 social workers,60 probation 
officers,60 and aftercare counselors.61 More distressing is the observa-
tion that juveniles are often retained in the same facilities with 
criminals.62 This fact not only suggests major problems for the 
rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents; it also undercuts the very 
proposition of distinguishable treatment programs for juveniles and 
criminals. Perhaps Justice Roberts is correct in his assertion that 
juvenile institutions are far superior to other penal institutions, but 
there appears to be no empirical evidence to support this contention, 
and the studies cited here indicate that even if the juvenile facilities 
are superior, they remain critically deficient. 
Drawing a final distinction between the status of the delinquent 
and that of the criminal, Justice Roberts asserted that the label of 
delinquent is less onerous than the criminal label and therefore the 
impact of being declared delinquent in a juvenile proceeding is not 
as great as the impact of being adjudged guilty as a criminal. The 
Task Force Report, however, concludes that "a delinquent is gener-
ally viewed by employers, schools, the armed services-by society 
generally-as a criminal."63 Moreover, the Task Force Report notes 
the failure of the states to keep delinquency determinations confi-
dential64 and the detrimental effect that this information has on the 
individual's later chances of getting a job.65 Even assuming Justice 
13 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1, 89 (1967). Although the capacity problems vary from state 
to state, the vast majority of delinquent children in all states are confined in institu• 
lions exceeding the maximum prescribed by the American Psychiatric Association, Id. 
57. Of the 282 psychologists estimated by the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency [hereinafter NCCD] as the minimum required for juveniles in institutions, 
only 182 were actually available. Moreover, 106 of those 182 were found in 9 states. Id. 
at 82-83. 
58. Of the 282 psychiatrists estimated by the NCCD as the minimum required for 
juvenile institutions, only 46 were actually available and more than half of these were 
found in 5 states. Id. at 82. 
59. NCCD placed the minimum figure for social workers in juvenile institutions at 
1413; only 926 were actually available. Id. at 83. 
60. When probation officers are available (165 counties have none), only a small 
percentage of the departments employ officers who meet the preferred educational 
standards. The officers must also handle caseloads far in excess of the maximum recom• 
mended by the NCCD. Id. at 50, 57, 63-64. 
61. Of the 40 states operating aftercare programs, only 34 adopted the minimal 
educational standards recommended for aftercare workers. However, the study found 
that in practice these standards were not observed, which resulted in the employment 
of many individuals without college educations as aftercare workers. Existing aftercare 
workers also must work with caseloads far exceeding the maximum prescribed by the 
NCCD. Id. at 101, 106-08. 
62. Justice Douglas in his dissent to McKeiver noted that in 1965 over 100,000 
juveniles were confined in adult penal institutions. 403 U.S. at 560. 
63. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 9. 
64. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 92-93. 
65. TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 54, at 54. 
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Roberts is correct that "delinquent" is a less onerous label than 
"criminal," it must nevertheless be recognized that a determination 
of delinquency carries with it tremendous liabilities that may pre-
vent the individual from attaining the level of employment of which 
he is capable. 
One can only conclude that the McKeiver Court, though es-
chewing the "simplistic" categorization of a juvenile proceeding as 
either civil or criminal, 66 has in fact been swayed by labels. The 
fragile distinctions betwen the labels and the realities they repre-
sent are a weak basis for the denial of any due process right. Such 
distinctions are particularly inapposite in the present context, for 
they have been invoked to preclude application of the right to 
jury trial established in Duncan. Duncan itself rejected any cate-
gorical distinctions based upon the labels attributed to the pro-
ceeding. 67 Basic to the right to jury trial under Duncan is the 
punitive nature and length of the commitment. Moreover, the length 
is not computed on the basis of the sentence actually received but 
upon the maximum possible sentence for that crime, since that 
maximum purportedly reflects the opinion of the legislature, and 
therefore the public, on the seriousness of the offense charged. This 
test for determining those commitments serious enough to require 
jury trial, as applied in Duncan, was substantially derived from 
District of Columbia v. Clawans68 and was used in Bloom v. Illinois69 
to extend the right to jury trial to another historically "noncriminal" 
area for purposes of the sixth amendment, that of criminal contempt 
citations. In Bloom, the Court agreed with the defendant attorney 
that his due process right to a jury trial was denied when he was 
given a twenty-four month sentence for wilfully attempting to pro-
bate a will known by him to be false. The Court applied reasoning 
basically derived from Claw ans and Duncan to reverse and remand 
Bloom's conviction. This test has since been employed and refined 
in Baldwin v. New York,70 in which the Court determined that any 
offense that carries with it a possible imprisonment of greater than 
six months requires a jury trial. If the Baldwin test were applied to 
66. 403 U.S. at 541. 
67. The Duncan Court was presented in part lvith the problem of drawing lines 
between the categories of "petty" and "serious" offenses for purposes of jury trial. It 
rejected divisions based upon these labels and looked instead to the possible conse-
quences of the adjudication for its criterion. See also te.'\'.t accompanying note 70 infra. 
68. But the penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major relevance in 
determining whether it is serious or not and may in itself, if severe enough subject 
the trial to the mandates of the Sixth Amendment. District of Columbia v. 
Clawans, 300 U.S. 607 (1937). The penalty authorized by the law of the locality 
may be taken "as a gauge of its sooal and ethical judgments," 300 U.S. at 628, of 
the crime in question. 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 159-60. 
69. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
70. 399 U.S. 66 (1970). ., 
182 Michigan Law Review (Vol, 70 
juvenile proceedings, it is clear that most juvenile defendants would 
be entitled to a jury trial on demand. Virtually all states have juve-
nile statutes with provisions that grant courts the power to retain 
custody over a delinquent juvenile until that juvenile reaches 
majority.71 Depending upon the age of majority in a given state, a 
child of twdve like Samuel Winship might be committed for a maxi-
mum of from four to nine years. 
The question remains whether the juvenile's commitment is 
punitive in nature. If juvenile commitment is punitive, there does 
not appear to be a further basis for distinction under Duncan be-
tween juvenile proceedings and the criminal trials of adults. Con-
ceding that the ideals of compassion, help, and treatment remain 
the "language" of juvenile officials, the Task Force Report neverthe-
less concludes: "[I]t has become clear that in fact the same purposes 
that characterize the use of criminal law for adult offenders-retri-
bution, condemnation, deterrence, incapacitation-are involved in 
the disposition of juvenile offenders too."72 In Gault, Justice Fortas 
drew a similar conclusion by equating, for purposes of Court review, 
juvenile institutions with penal institutions.78 Justice Douglas' dis-
sent in McKeiver further emphasized that many juveniles actually 
are confined to adult facilities, making it virtually impossible to 
distinguish, in those cases, between the nature of the incarceration 
of juveniles and adults.74 Yet the majority held that Duncan is not 
applicable to juvenile hearings because the system of juvenile justice 
cannot be equated with the criminal process, a proposition that ap-
pears suspect.76 
Having thus limited the application of Duncan, the M cKeiver 
majority considered the second crucial issue: whether the present 
juvenile court system is fundamentally fair.76 The fundamental fair-
ness test has evolved through a series of decisions as the standard by 
which the Court determines which provisions of the Bill of Rights 
are applicable to the states through the due process clause of the 
71. See, e.g., D.C. CoDE § 11-1551 (1967), amending D.C. CoDE § 11-907 (1961), 
which was interpreted by the Kent Court to restrict custody to the juvenile's minority. 
383 U.S. at 554 & n.18. 
72. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 8. 
73. "It is no constitutional consequence-and limited practical meaning-that the 
institution to which the juvenile is committed is called an Industrial School." 387 U.S. 
at 27. 
74. See note 62 supra. 
75. Although basing his concurrence solely on the presumption Duncan was 1rrongly 
decided, Justice Harlan noted that had he accepted the majority's premise he would 
have "great difficulty ••• in holding that the jury trial right docs not extend to state 
juvenile proceedings." Only when juvenile systems were "restructured to fit their orig• 
inal purpose" could Justice Harlan agree to deny juveniles the right to trial by jury. 
403 U.S. at 557. 
76. 403 U.S. at 543. 
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fourteenth amendment. 77 If the Court finds that a state procedure 
contains sufficient safeguards to ensure a fair trial it need not inter-
vene, since the individual's hearing is "fundamentally fair" even 
though the state procedure may differ from the specific provisions in 
the Bill of Rights. The test poses two major interpretive problems 
because each Justice must make two determinations based primarily 
on subjective criteria: (1) what values must be protected in order 
to assure a fair trial, and (2) to what degree each of these values must 
be protected. As might be expected, Justices frequently disagree 
upon the application of the test. 
The majority in McKeiver applied a carefully limited funda-
mental fairness test that failed to address critical considerations in 
determining which values are necessary to a fair trial. Their analysis 
was limited to the single question whether the judge as a fact-finder 
is so inherently inaccurate that due process requires a jury trial for 
increased accuracy.78 Such a limitation overlooks the basic proposition 
that the jury serves critical safeguard functions in the American judi-
cial system other than solely fact-finding. It is conceivable, for example, 
that a judge, theoretically capable of making an accurate finding of 
facts, might interpret them harshly in a given case for extrinsic 
reasons. A suggestion of such extrinsic motives might be found in 
Burrus, where black children were tried in a closed hearing, without 
a jury, solely on the complaints and testimony of state highway 
patrolmen. The juveniles were found delinquent for engaging in a 
civil rights demonstration in a small North Carolina ·town by a 
judge who, as noted by Justice Brennan, may well have been moti-
vated by personal or political prejudice. 79 
The opinions of Justices Brennan and White evidence a broader 
approach to the fundamental fairness analysis. Their approach to 
the fundamental fairness analysis would consider whether the juve-
nile system provides adequate safeguards to protect all the essential 
values traditionally protected by the jury in the criminal system. 
77. The concept of "due process of law" applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment has been significantly expanded over the past three decades since 
its restrictive application in Palko v. Connecticut, 202 U.S. 219 (1927), and Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). The most recent formulation of the test, found in 
Duncan, is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." 391 U.S. at 149. This 
test subsequently was reaffirmed by the Court in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 
794-95 (1969). Although the changes from one test to the next seem largely semantic, 
they reflect differing attitudes of the Court toward the incorporation of rights into 
the vague phrase "due process of law." See generally Fairman, Does the Fourteenth 
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. 
R.Ev. 5 (1949); Friendly, The Bill of Rights As a Code of Criminal Procedure, 52 CALIF. 
L. REv. 929 (1965); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1956). 
78. 403 U.S. at 543. 
79. 403 U.S. at 554, 556. 
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Justice ·Brennan felt a critical function of the jury was protection 
of juveniles from government oppression, but concluded that a 
public trial may "[t]o some extent" provide "similar protection."80 
As noted by Justice White, the jury serves as a buffer against an 
overzealous prosecutor; it protects the individual from judicial bias 
as well as from corrupt or politically motivated justice.81 To this list 
might be added the fear of judicial incompetence, justifiably greater 
in juvenile courts than in the criminal courts.82 The Court has 
recognized and affirmed these other roles. As recently as the Baldwin 
decision, the Court was heard to say: "[T]he primary purpose of 
the jury is to prevent the possibility of oppression by the Govern-
ment. "83 It is indeed unfortunate that the majority limited its con-
siderations to accurate fact-finding as the only function of the jury. 
Even when the narrow question the majority addressed-whether 
a trial before a judge is inherently accurate-is considered alone, 
one is compelled to conclude that the majority failed to demon-
strate convincingly that juvenile hearings without a jury satisfy the 
requirements of fundamental fairness. Justice Black.mun found 
several sources of authority to support the majority's rather brief 
analysis of the fundamental fairness question.84 First, Justice Black-
mun stated that dicta in Duncan specifically recognized that nonjury 
trials may meet the requirements of fundamental fairness.81i He 
further contended that this conclusion was supported by the Court's 
decision in DeStefano to give Duncan only prospective application.80 
In Duncan, the Court stated in dictum, "We would not assert, how-
ever, that every criminal trial-or any particular trial-held before 
a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly 
treated by a judge as he would be by a jury."87 It appears, however, 
·that Justice Blackmun lifted this statement out of context. The 
Duncan opinion stated in the following sentence: "Thus, we hold 
no constitutional doubts about the practices, common in both 
federal and state courts, of accepting waivers of jury trial and prose-
cuting petty crimes without extending a right to jury trial."88 This 
language apparently limits the statement quoted by Justice Black-
80. 403 U.S. at 555. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text. 
81. 403 U.S. at 552. Justice White with little explanation concluded that the right 
to a jury trial was not necessary to champion these values in the juvenile court setting. 
82. See text accompanying note 100 infra. 
83. 399 U.S. at 72. Accord, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 n.23 (1968); 
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965). 
84. 403 U.S. at 543-44, 547. 
85. 403 U.S. at 543-44, 547. 
86. See text accompanying note 39 supra. 
87. 391 U.S. at 158. 
88. 391 U.S. at 158 (footnotes omitted). 
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mun to two situations, waivers of jury trial and petty crimes, neither 
of which is dispositive of the present issue. · 
Justice Blackmun further cited footnote fourteen of the Duncan 
opinion as support for his argument that a jury trial is not necessary 
for a fair and equitable process.89 Justice Roberts had also cited this 
footnote in his opinion in Terry, quoting the portion that stated: 
[A] criminal process which was fair and equitable, but used no juries 
is easy to imagine. It would make use of alternative guarantees and 
protections which would serve the purpose the jury serves in the Eng-
lish and American system. 90 
As the dissenting justice in Terry noted,91 this language may, in 
fact, be an affirmance of the need for a jury trial to meet the require-
ments of fundamental fairness. When read with the qualifications 
put upon it by the Duncan Court,92 this language probably stands 
for the proposition that fair nonjury trials are conceivable in other 
systems but jury trials have become integral to our system. Moreover, 
any faith that might have been invested in criminal court judges by 
such dicta appears to be misplaced with juvenile court judges.93 
The majority's use of the DeStefano rule as later applied in the 
DeBacker dismissal is similarly unconvincing and ultimately proves 
a two-edged sword, cutting against the majority's assumption that 
fact-finding is the only function of the jury. By citing the DeStefano 
rule that the right to jury trial be given only prospective applica-
tion, 04 Justice Blackmun implied that the Court had already recog-
nized that a jury trial is not necessary for accurate fact-finding. This 
89. 403 U.S. at 547. 
90. 438 Pa. at 346, 265 A.2d at 353, quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
150 n.14 (1968). 
91. I cannot agree with the majority [in Terry] that footnote 14 in Duncan or 
anything else in the opinion represents a restriction on the absolutism of the 
holding .•.• That [footnote] in no sense narrows the holding of Duncan; if any-
thing it amplifies it by emphasizing the role the jury plays in the Anglo-American 
system of jurisprudence. 
438 Pa. at 352, 265 A.2d at 356 (Cohen, J., dissenting). See Note, Jury Trials for Juve-
niles: Toward a More Effective Juvenile Court System, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 780 (1971). 
92. The following ·portions of footnote fourteen from Duncan are in controversy: 
The recent cases, on the other hand, have proceeded upon the valid assumption 
that state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual 
systems bearing virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that has 
been developing contemporaneously in England and in this country. The question 
thus is whether given this kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental-
whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered 
liberty .••• 
• • • A criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no juries is easy to 
imagine. It would make use of alternative guarantees and, protections which would 
serve the purposes that the jury serves in the English and American systems. Yet 
no American State has undertaken to construct such a system •••• 
391 U.S. at 149-50 n.14. 
93. See text accompanying note 100 infra. 
94. 403 U.S. at 543. 
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implication arises from the nature of the test traditionally applied 
by the Court to determine retroactive application of criminal pro-
cedure rules. Although the test is often oversimplified to a question 
whether the rights extended by the primary case go to the issue of 
fairness of trial or official misconduct, 95 the test, in fact, also considers 
two other issues.96 Thus, a right extended by the Court that affects 
the fairness of a criminal hearing may be given prospective applica-
tion if retroactive application would cause major problems in the 
administration of justice and if government authorities have relied 
in good faith on the prior Court decision. 
Although purportedly addressing all three parts of the test, the 
DeStefano Court emphasized the adverse effect retroactive application 
would have on the administration of criminal justice and the obvious 
good-faith reliance by the states on previous decisions.97 In fact, the 
Court's only real support for the proposition that a jury does not 
affect the fairness of the hearing is the single line taken from Duncan, 
which is arguably addressed to the waiver and petty crimes ques-
tions.98 Indeed, as the Court went on to consider whether Bloom 
should be given retroactive application, it admitted that although 
the accuracy of fact-finding was suspect, the good-faith reliance by 
the states and the substantial effect on the administration of justice 
tipped the scales in favor of prospective application.99 Such reasoning 
is a strong indication that the Court was willing to limit the right to 
jury trial to prospective application primarily because of the adminis-
trative effects on the system; the decision should not be taken as a 
general endorsement of the accuracy of a nonjury trial. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Justice Blackmun's reading of Deste-
fano is correct, his interpretation poses insurmountable problems 
for the majority's analysis of the fundamental fairness requirement. 
If Justice Blackmun's inference is correct-that failure of the Court 
to apply Duncan retroactively implies a necessary determination by 
the Court that the level of fact-finding accuracy in nonjury trials 
does not destroy the fairness of a trial-the decision of the Court in 
95. Broadly stated, if the purpose of the right extended by the Court is deterrence 
of official misconduct, then retroactive application is futile because the wrongful acts 
are completed and the fairness of the actual trial is not questioned. If, on the other 
hand, the Court's purpose in extending the right is to ensure a fair trial, then retro-
active application is deemed necessary because the individual may be innocent and 
thus unjustly punished. Retroactive application under this theory would likewise seem 
to be required when a right extended by the Court serves in part to accomplish both 
purposes, as may well be the situation with the right to jury trial. See Linklctter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-40 (1965). See generally Note, Retroactivity of Constitu-
tional Decisions, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 206 (1965). 
96. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 283, 297 (1967). 
97. 392 U.S. at 633-34. 
98. See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra. 
99. 392 U.S. at 634-35. 
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Duncan, extending the right to jury trial to state criminal proceed-
ing-s, must have been motivated by considerations other than just the 
accuracy of fact-finding, e.g., the possibility of official misconduct. 
This conclusion would seem to indicate that the majority incorrectly 
limited its fundamental fairness analysis to the sole issue of accuracy 
of fact-finding. 
Another factor that casts considerable doubt on the majority's 
fundamental fairness analysis is the empirical evidence that under-
mines the proposition that present juvenile judges have the capacity 
to be accurate fact-finders. The Task Force Report revealed that 
juvenile court judges are generally undereducated, undertrained, 
and constrained by such harsh time demands that it is almost impos-
sible to believe that accurate fact-finding is achieved. A nationwide 
poll conducted by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
determined that one fifth of all juvenile court judges have no college 
education, half have not received undergraduate degrees, twenty-nine 
per cent do not have law degrees, and one fifth are not members of 
the bar.100 Moreover, two other studies cited by the Task Force 
reveal that the average juvenile court hearing lasts fifteen minutes 
or less, which is about half the time estimated by the National Coun-
cil on Crime and Delinquency as necessary for proper consideration 
of the issues.101 Accurate fact-finding would seemingly be difficult 
for even a well-trained judge forced to operate under such stringent 
time demands. 
Likewise damaging to the majority's fundamental fairness anal-
ysis is the fact that juvenile court judges may be prejudiced by cer-
tain institutional factors within the juvenile court system. In some 
jurisdictions, the juvenile court judge is not prevented from reading 
a social report on the accused juvenile prior to the hearing, allegedly 
to help him in his determination of delinquency.102 Although some 
judges might resist the influence of a social report relating a history 
of delinquent acts, many undoubtedly are influenced by such a re-
port. Clearly this type of evidence would be considered prejudicial 
in a criminal proceeding. Moreover, a recent study questions the 
quality and impartiality of social reports.103 It should also be noted 
100. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 7, citing McCune & Skoler, supra note 50. 
The Task Force Report failed to include the fact that 29% of the judges had not 
earned law degrees. See McCune & Skoler, supra note 50, at 125. 
101. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 7, citing NCCD, THE Coo:&: COUNTY 
FAMILY GUVENILE) COURT AND .ARTHUR J. AUDY HOME 28•29 (1963); GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL 
STUDY CownssION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, A STUDY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA pt. 2, at 16 (1960). 
102. Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 281, 
335-36 (1967). 
103. Fogel, The Fate of the Rehabilitative Ideal in California Youth Authority 
Dispositions, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 479 (1969). The author, after examination of 
social reports, concludes they lack psychological insight and a rehabilitative viewpoint. 
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that repeated appearances before the judge of the same witnesses, 
such as social workers and corrections officers, who testify against 
many juveniles over a long period of time, may cause the judge to 
give their testimony undue weight. Justice Blackmun in fact recog-
nized these problems, but concluded that for the Court to concern 
itself with them would be to ignore the ideals of fairness and sympa-
thy that the juvenile system contemplates.104 The Court chose instead 
to ignore reality. 
The largest portion of the majority opinion in McKeiver does 
not purport to deal with the question of fundamental fairness or the 
application of Duncan to juvenile court proceedings. Most of the 
opinion is devoted to the assertion that extension of the right to jury 
trial to juvenile cases will inhibit future reform and flexibility in the 
juvenile system. Indeed, one suspects that this was the principal 
motivating factor in the majority decision. The majority contended 
that extension of the right to jury trial to juvenile proceedings will 
preclude future reform and experimentation in the juvenile system 
by the states, thereby ending any hopes of attaining the ideal of parens 
patriae. Although this fear might initially appear justified, consider-
ation of juvenile court statistics and the crucial problems of the 
juvenile system indicates that granting the right to jury trial will 
have minimal effect on future reform of the juvenile process. 
Three out of four juveniles taken into custody never reach the 
hearing stage,105 and it is doubtful whether any change in the ad-
judicatory phase of the hearing would affect these juveniles. More-
over, of those juveniles who now reach the hearing stage, a very small 
percentage request jury trials in those jurisdictions in which a jury 
trial is available.108 There is no reason to assume that a larger per-
centage of accused juveniles will request jury trials if they are avail-
able in all jurisdictions as a matter of right, and it is difficult to 
understand how this small percentage of cases could reverse any 
current trend toward reform of the entire system. It would seem 
that those few juveniles who want to be tried before a jury should 
be allowed their request rather than be relegated to the customary 
fifteen-minute hearing before a judge.107 
104. 403 U.S. at 550. 
105. The Task Force reports that approximately 50% of the juveniles officially 
taken into custody (unofficial contacts are not reported) are not referred to the juvenile 
court but are referred to welfare agencies, released to their parents' custody, or other-
wise handled outside the courts. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 12-13. Of those 
juveniles referred to the court, the proportion of those handled prior to the formal 
hearing stage has remained relatively constant at about I in 2. Id. at 14. 
106. In the McKeiver dissent, Justice Douglas noted an amicus brief which reported 
that in those 10 states and the District of Columbia where jury trial was available, 
the total requests for jury trial in the past 5½ years were 15 or less in 22 of the 26 
cities surveyed. 403 U.S. at 561 note (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Note, Juvenile Delin-
quents: The Police, State Courts, and Individuali%ed Justice, 79 HAR.v. L. REv. 775, 
793.94 (1966). 
107. See text accompanying note 101 supra. McKciver's hearing presents an excellent 
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The question that remains is whether those juveniles who request 
jury trials will be adversely affected in relation to their total experi-
ence in the juvenile process. The Court answered that question in 
Winship with regard to another due process right,108 when Justice 
White stated: 
[T]he opportunity during the post-adjudicatory or dispositional 
hearing for a wide-ranging review of the child's social history and for 
his individualized treatment ·will remain unimpaired. Similarly, there 
will be no effect on the procedures distinctive to juvenile proceedings 
that are employed prior to the adjudicatory hearing ... ,109 
Justice White concluded that the due process rights extended to 
juveniles in Gault and Winship" 'will not compel the States to aban-
don or displace any of the substantive benefits of juvenile pro-
cess.' "110 Nor will such changes preclude reform in those same areas. 
The analogy benveen Winship and McKeiver is clear. Both cases 
deal with rights confined exclusively to the adjudicatory phase, 
which is only a small part of the long multistage process through 
which the juvenile passes. To conclude, as the majority did, that 
change within this single phase precludes improvement in the many 
other parts of the juvenile process seems not only unwarranted but 
also inconsistent with the specific language of the Court in Winship. 
In a related observation, the McKeiver majority opined that the 
jury would bring with it the problems of the criminal system-the 
"traditional delay, the formality and the clamor of the adversary 
system and, possibly, the public trial,"111 to the juvenile system, 
which ideally should provide speedy relief and shield the juvenile 
from destructive exposure. In light of previous Court decisions and 
empirical studies, the majority's fear again appears groundless. The 
undeniable delay presently plaguing criminal courts exemplifies a 
problem of the criminal system not likely to arise in the juvenile 
system because of differing attitudes of juveniles and adults toward 
jury trial. Any attempt to equate the nvo systems on this question 
ignores the fact that the percentage of defendants in criminal prose-
cutions requesting jury trial is approximately fifteen per cent,112 
while, as can best be established, the percentage of juveniles request-
ing trial must be very low.113 The majority suggested that the District 
of Columbia is an example of a jurisdiction where trial backlog has 
example of a situation in whlch the credibility of the witnesses is in sufficient doubt 
that a jury should be employed to deliberate and weigh the conflicting testimony. See 
note 2 supra. 
108, See text accompanying note 42 supra. 
109. 397 U.S: at 366-67. 
IIO. 397 U.S. at 367, quoting In re Gault, 387 tJ.S. 1, 21 (1967). 
III. 403 U.S. at 550. 
ll2. H. KAI.VEN &: H. ZEI.sEL, THE AMERICAN JtJRY 18 (1966), 
113. See note 106 supra. 
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compelled the revocation of the right to jury trial in juvenile cases.114 
A backlog problem similar to that in the District of Columbia, how-
ever, does not seem to have occurred in other major cities. The back-
log is more likely the result of the meteoric rise in the number of 
juvenile cases in the District than it is the result of the allegedly 
delaying effects of jury trials.116 
The majority's fear of increased formality from jury trials pre-
sents a thornier issue, primarily because there is general disagreement 
among authorities on the question whether formal or informal pro-
cedure is best for the juvenile. Traditionally, informal procedure 
was preferred because it reflected the benevolent motives of the 
state.116 Viewed in this light, informal procedure was central to 
a realization of the parens patriae concept. Recently, however, several 
authorities have attacked informality and now endorse more formal 
procedures, a fact recognized by both the Task Force117 and the 
Gault Court.118 Despite this apparent shift in opinion, the McKeiver 
majority evidently still adheres to the proposition that informality is 
an asset rather than a handicap in juvenile proceedings. 
Even if one assumes that informality is desirable, a quick review 
of the juvenile system reveals that informality is another ideal of the 
judicial process that is rarely realized. The juvenile is in fact fre-
quently treated with the same formality as an adult suspect. From the 
time he is taken into custody, likely by a police officer, and given the 
"Miranda" warning and opportunity to call for legal assistance, to the 
114. 403 U.S. at 550. The reasons actually given by the Associate Deputy Attorney 
General of the District of Columbia for the elimination of jury trial included: the 
juvenile court was rehabilitative in nature; the juvenile court judges were competent: 
at the end of 1969, there were 290 juvenile cases awaiting jury trials; and the Supreme 
Court had not yet extended to juveniles the right to jury trial. Supplement to Hear-
ings on H.R. 14134, H.R. 14224, H.R. 14189, H.R. 256, H.R. 2747, S. 545 Before Sub• 
comm. No. J of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 91st Cong,, 2d Scss., 
at 34 (Comm. Print 1970). 
115. As compared to the same period in 1968, the District of Columbia juvenile 
court statistics for the last quarter of 1969 showed an increase in the number of 
complaints and cases referred to juvenile authorities from 1500 and 1400 respectively 
to 2400 and 2000, or a percentage increase of 60% and 43% in a single year. Id, at 114, 
Table I. 
116. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
117. [T]here has been increasing feeling on the part of sociologists and social 
welfare people that the informal procedures, contrary to the original expectation, 
may themselves constitute a further obstacle to effective treatment of the delin• 
quent. This feeling is based in part upon the often observed sense of injustice 
engendered in the .child by seemingly all-powerful and challengeless exercise of 
authority by judges and probation officers, based, in the child's eyes, on incon-
sistency, hypocrisy, favoritism, and whimsy. 
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 31, citing D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 
136 (1964). 
118. [R]ecent studies have, with surprising unanimity • • • suggest[ed] that the 
appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in 
short, the essentials of due process-may be a more impressive and more thera-
peutic attitude [than the informal attitude] so far as the juvenile is concerned, 
387 U.S. at 26. 
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final disposition in reformatories comparable in every respect to 
prisons,119 the juvenile is usually treated like a criminal.120 It may 
indeed be argued that the juvenile system is as cold and harsh, in 
most respects, as the criminal system and that the jury trial could not 
appreciably increase the formal nature of the juvenile's total experi-
ence in the present juvenile justice system nor significantly affect the 
juvenile's total impression of the system. 
Similarly, the majority's fear that jury trial would result in public 
trial for juveniles is wholly unsupported within the text of the 
opinion and conflicts with views expressed by members of the Court, 
past and present. It is not clear that extension of the right to jury 
trial will result in public trial in juvenile cases. In Gault, the Court 
considered this basic question and concluded: "In any event, there 
is no reason why, consistently with due process, a state cannot con-
tinue, if it deems it appropriate, to provide and to improve provision 
for the confidentiality of records of police contacts and court actions 
relating to juveniles."121 It simply does not follow in any logical fash-
ion that extension of the right to jury trial will ultimately force 
public trials on the juvenile system. Indeed, under Justice Brennan's 
analysis, denial of the right to jury trial necessitates a public trial to 
protect vital rights of the accused in a juvenile proceeding.122 
As a final reason for denial of the right to jury trial in juvenile 
cases, the majority observed that three model court acts, a majority of 
state legislatures and courts that have considered the question, and 
the Task Force Report all failed to recommend extension of this 
right to juveniles.123 Unquestionably, past committees, legislatures, 
and courts have not deemed the jury necessary in juvenile hearings, 
and such decisions should be given some weight. It must: however, 
be noted that the impact of these decisions and reports is largely quali-
fied by the presence of factors and assumptions not bearing on the 
M cKeiver Court. The context of the model court acts explain their 
failure to recommend that the right to jury trial be included in state 
juvenile court procedure. Both the Legislative Guide for Drafting 
Family and Juvenile Court Acts124 and the Uniform Juvenile Court 
Act125 propose completely renovated juvenile systems-with separate 
adjudicative and dispositional phases,126 rules of evidence precluding 
ll9. See note 73 supra. 
120. See generally Weiss, The Poor Kid, 9 DUQUESNE L. REv. 590 (1971). 
121. 387 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added). 
122. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra. 
123. 403 U.S. at 545-50. 
124. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE FOR DRAFrING FAMILY AND JUVENILE COURT Acrs (issued by 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1969) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE 
GUIDE]. · 
125. UNIFOR?.I JUVENILE COURT Acr [hereinafter UNIFORM Acr]. 
126. l.EGISLATJVE GUIDE § 32(a)-(d); UNIFOlUlr Acr § 29. 
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pretrial reading of the social report,121 highly confidential records,128 
and separation of delinquents from children found neglected or in 
need of supervision.129 If the Court were considering a system with 
these safeguards, perhaps it could then consider the recommendations 
of the committees. But the Court is facing a quite different situation, 
one in which the states have not adopted the reforms envisaged in 
the model acts. It is submitted that the Court should view the prob-
lem in light of present procedures and abuses as recognized by the 
Task Force and the Gault Court, not through the eyes 'of a long-
range reformer. The Standard Juvenile Court Act,130 drafted in 1959, 
is an excellent example of legislation based upon pre-Gault parens 
patriae thinking. As noted in the comments, this act is based upon 
assumptions that the hearing should have an "informal conference 
atmosphere" and be purely "civil in nature"131-assumptions clearly 
out of date in light of Kent, Gault, and Winship. The question the 
Court should address is whether a jury is necessary now to protect a 
juvenile's rights, not whether a jury is required at some future time 
in a completely revamped juvenile system. 
The fact that many legislatures have failed to extend the right of 
jury trial probably reflects public apathy; it certainly cannot be 
construed to represent a specific value decision made on the basis of 
the facts that are now known. Bemoaning public and legislative indif-
ference to the problems of juveniles as it did,132 the McKeiver Court 
should have been hesitant to use that same indifference as justification 
for its own inaction. Had the Court waited for the legislatures to 
act, juveniles would today, in all probability, still be denied the rights 
extended in Gault and Winship. Although the juvenile system is 
admitted by all to need reform, the reasoning of the majority seem-
ingly precludes the Court from providing the impetus for any change. 
Little need be said about the Task Force's failure to recommend 
that the right to jury trial be extended to juvenile cases, except that 
in the pre-Gault era it may have felt such constitutional steps beyond 
its mandate. Certainly, the condition of the juvenile process revealed 
by the Task Force Report undermines the parens patriae doctrine, 
relied on heavily by the majority to support the decision in McKeiver. 
In light of Gault and Duncan and the facts gathered by the Task 
Force, the Court has an altogether different context in which to view 
the question. 
The significance of the Court's decision in McKeiver must be 
127, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE§ 30; UNIFORM Ac::r § 28(a). 
128. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE§§ 45-48; UNIFORM Ac::r §§ 54-57. 
129. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE § 34; UNIFORM Ac::r §§ 30-32. 
130. STANDARD JUVENILE CouRT Ac::r (proposed by the National Council on Crime 
and Delinquency) [hereinafter STANDARD Ac::r]. 
131. STANDARD Ac::r § 19, Comments. 
132. 403 U.S. at 544. 
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examined in the context of two basic questions: (I) what is the inde-
pendent significance of the Court's decision to deny the right to jury 
trial in juvenile delinquency proceedings, and (2) does the McKeiver 
decision reflect a shift in the Court's position toward extension of 
due process rights in general to juvenile delinquency proceedings? 
The practical impact of McKeiver may be relatively insignificant, 
simply because it is likely that few juveniles would exercise the right 
to jury trial even if it were generally available.133 Moreover, the 
McKeiver opinion addressed only one small problem among the 
myriad of pressing problems in the whole juvenile system. As was 
recognized by the Task Force, the juvenile system lacks the basic re-
sources and knmvledge to achieve the ideal of parens patriae and effec-
tive treatment of the juvenile offender.134 Undoubtedly, extension 
of the jury trial right to the juvenile delinquency process would not 
significantly help in the solution of these core problems. However, 
the fact that the right to jury trial does not address these problems 
directly is not an adequate justification for the majority decision. 
There are problems, albeit of lesser importance, in the present pro-
cedures of juvenile courts that arguably would be solved by the pres-
ence of a jury.135 To the extent the majority contention-that jury 
trials in juvenile delinquency proceedings will preclude future re-
form of the system by the states-is correct, the result in McKeiver 
is perhaps justified. It is submitted, however, that extension of the 
right to jury trial would not significantly preclude future reform of 
the juvenile system. Therefore, the Court in McKeiver appears to 
have unjustifiably avoided solution of real problems in the juvenile 
delinquency system. 
In a larger sense, the McKeiver opinion may be more significant 
as an indication of a new attitude by the majority of the Court toward 
the application of all due process rights to juvenile delinquency 
proceedings. After Kent and Gault the Court appeared willing to 
scrutinize the procedures of the juvenile delinquency process as they 
actually function. McKeiver seems to signify a return to the position 
of the Court prior to Kent, that present procedural defects are out-
weighed by the possible stultification of reform in the system. Indeed, 
this was the rationale of Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Winship.136 
If, as appears true, the majority has accepted the Burger view, the 
vitality of Gault must be re-examined.137 
133. See note 106 supra and accompanying text. 
134. See note 55 supra. 
135. See text accompanying notes 80-83 8: 100-04 supra. 
136. See note 44 supra. 
137. If one were to accept the proposition that delinquency proceedings have, to 
a large degree, potentially overlapping jurisdiction with neglect and dependency pro-
ceedings, then juvenile authorities could render impotent the reforms of Gault and 
Winship by simply choosing to obtain jurisdiction over the juvenile by these neglect 
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If the due process rights extended to juveniles in Gault are to 
remain secure, the McKeiver rationale must be limited to the narrow 
question of the right to jury trial. Arguably the McKeiver decision 
merely stands for the proposition that the right to jury trial is not so 
important as the basic due process rights extended to juveniles in 
Gault and Winship.138 If this is in fact the extent of the Court's hold-
ing in McKeiver, juveniles will continue to benefit from the pro-
cedural safeguards granted in Gault and Winship. 
It is likely, however, that the future impact of McKeiver will 
undermine Gault and Winship and presage a trend away from any 
due process analysis in juvenile delinquency cases. The majority's 
implicit acceptance of the parens patriae doctrine as a theoretical 
justification for the existing juvenile delinquency process is incon-
sistent with the application of due process rights to the juvenile 
system. The attitude of the Court expressed in McKeiver bodes ill 
for future equating of the juvenile system with the criminal justice 
system, necessary for complete constitutional scrutiny under the due 
process clause. Thus, a system that is essentially criminal in nature 
will continue to operate with only minimal due process safeguards 
in the interminable pursuit of an elusive ideal. 
and dependency proceedings. In the absence of constitutional scrutiny of these pro• 
ceedings, delinquent juveniles could again be committed without the procedural 
safeguards of Gault and Winship. The interrelationships among the various jurisdic• 
tional bases for the juvenile court are unsettled and require more extensive treatment 
than is possible in the limited setting of McKeiver. For one view of the problem, sec 
Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of Wyman v. 
James, 69 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1259 (1971). 
138. See text accompanying notes 34 & 42 supra. 
